As part of the 80th anniversary of The Battle of Britain, Soul City Wanderer tells the incredible story of the first WWII bombing raid on Croydon, August 15th 1940.
Here in part three, he notes the controversial nature of the attack, and challenges the received historic interpretation of events.
As such a calamitous event, for both sides, the Croydon Airport attack by the Luftwaffe 210 bomber group on August 15th 1940, seems to have been somewhat airbrushed out of history. Especially when you consider its impact: the first major aerial bombing attack on Greater London, the significant loss of life, the serious casualty figures, the major damage and destruction it wrought on infrastructure, and the high ratio of German aircraft losses.
Very few history books or documentaries mention it, and if they do, it’s only in passing. For example, in 2020, Channel 5 ran a three-part series entitled: Battle of Britain – Three Days that Saved the Nation. Produced by Lion TV, it was fronted by the respected historians Kate Humble and Dan Snow. The first episode was all about August 15th, 1940. It was generally well presented with plenty of human angles. However, the day’s events rather abruptly conclude with the bombing raid on Portland at 6:20pm, with the inference that it was the last of the day. Sloppy, really, as it was precisely at that time that Luftwaffe 210 bomber group were about to launch August 15th’s final and most devastating attack.
Other historic accounts seem to dismiss the strategic accomplishment and importance of the raid because it is suggested that somehow 210 group ‘mistook Croydon for Kenley’. There are various reasons given. One is that as they approached Kenley, the group was suddenly dispersed when it was intercepted by RAF squadrons. Group Commander Rubensdörffer had regrouped his forces for another attack. But it is claimed they lost their bearings, and the airfield that (handily) loomed into their view was Croydon. A case of ‘mistaken identity’.
Is it too much of a coincidence that the bombing raid on West Malling at roughly the same time is also labelled as ‘mistaken’? In this attack, a Dornier group flew in ahead of the 210 force. Apparently, they were heading for Biggin Hill, but were forced north-east to West Malling by RAF 32 squadron. The Dorniers must have reasonably expected a ‘welcome party’ at some point, and pinpointed it south of Biggin Hill. On engagement, had the Dorniers turned north-east they would have brought the RAF squadrons right into the path of the incoming 210 group. But by turning north-west they drew the ire of 32 squadron, while at the same time making for the legitimate target of West Malling without any sharp detour. Did the diversion mask what was to be their original target anyway?
There is also the claim that the reason the fighter escort left the 210 bombing party was because it got ‘lost’ over Bexley. Fighter escorts were always ‘inexplicably’ leaving bombing parties. It was one of Goring’s main complaints to his fighter-commanders. Perhaps on that day, as the 210 group rose in altitude to begin their bombing run, the escort felt they had done their job. They were already close to their 100-mile distance range.
Another theory is that the 210 group was flying into the low setting sun, and again, although their target was Kenley, they were blindsided into attacking Croydon. Even crew members hint at this one. Remembering Rubensdörffer’s comment “Are we over land or sea?” Lieutenant Koch said later he believed there may have been a “haze“, and Lieutenant Hinzte mentioned a “mist” at high altitude. Was it all just a smokescreen? Had the Germans conjured up a scotch mist in south London for the history books?
Hazy sunshine or not. It’s a bit of a stretch to imagine the Luftwaffe could mistake Croydon for Kenley from the air in 1940. The pear-shaped Kenley airfield was keenly surrounded by wooded countryside. Croydon aerodrome was nearly twice the size in area and situated in open fields at the edge of a large conurbation in a continuous ring of south London suburbs. Aside from the control tower, hangars and other associated buildings that you would expect at London’s international airport, there was a swimming lido in the playing fields opposite, closed but with high-diving boards visible. And more enticingly, a huge industrial plant lay just to the north-west of the airport. It included the Croydon ‘A’ power station (with its soaring wooden cooling towers), Beddington water-treatment works, the gasworks, and hundreds of production plants along Factory Lane and Imperial Way. Meanwhile, snaking through this landscape as a guiding landmark was the four-lane wide A23 bypass, built in 1924.
The pilots of 210 didn’t just jump into the cockpit and fly blind over England. They would have spent hours poring over maps and reconnaissance photographs, studying topological models and examining landmarks. Göring himself revealed that his special crews made intensive studies of targets, planned suitable methods of attack, and examined navigational solutions. In short, they did their homework. It has also been suggested that many of the 210 team had been civil aviation crew members before the war, and that they could easily recognise Croydon from when it had been London’s main peacetime airport.
Furthermore, from the Kent coast at Romney, the most direct route for the 210 group to Croydon was a straight line, hugging the contours of the High Weald and over Sevenoaks, which would lead you slap-bang between RAF Biggin Hill and RAF Kenley. It was too obvious and too risky to fly such a direct route. And they couldn’t bank to the west as they would then have been squeezed between RAF Kenley and RAF Redhill. What they did was to ‘skirt around the issue’, and launch their attack unexpectedly from the north-east.
In addition, it is hard to believe that the Luftwaffe bombed Croydon with such precision if it was a ‘mistaken’ hit. The targeting of the surrounding aviation industry buildings was surely not random, but clearly calculated. And there is no doubt the Luftwaffe were targeting strategic inland sites with precision at this stage. The Vauxhall plant at Luton and Vickers-Armstrong factory in Weybridge are testament to that.
Another claim is that Rubensdörffer himself was covering his tracks in ‘mistakenly’ hitting Croydon, because had he survived, he would have been court-martialled for going against Hitler’s express orders forbidding the bombing of London targets. However, strictly speaking, Croydon was not part of London. It was a town in Surrey with a London suburban boundary and did not have any municipal connections to the capital until 1965.
Moreover, Hitler himself had issued a directive on August 1st, extending Luftwaffe operations to the RAF-related industries, and Croydon Airport would have definitely fitted the bill. Indeed, a mission by Luftwaffe bomber wing KG54 to attack Croydon was cancelled on the morning of August 13th as the weather was bad. And on the very morning of August 15th, Göring had issued a directive to all Luftwaffe commanders specifically referring to the enemy aircraft industry as an alternative and legitimate target of strategic importance. Finally, if Rubensdörffer was heading for a court-martial, why was he posthumously decorated so honourably?
In my opinion, 210 Group Commander Walter Rubensdörffer knew exactly what he was going for on that fateful day of August 15th 1940: Croydon Airport. And he and his staff with Luftwaffe High Command backing, planned and executed the attack, diversionary tactics and all, with absolute precision.
Of course, there is always the possibility that Rubensdörffer was a something of a maverick, breaking the rules in a desperate bid to prove the effectiveness of his beloved dive-bombing squad.
Either way, it cost him his life, and the lives of many innocent others.
Sources
Bergström, Christer. Battle of Britain: An Epic Conflict Revisited. Casemate, 2015.
Collier, Richard. Eagle Day-Battle of Britain. Hodder & Staughton. 1996.
Goss, Chris; Cornwell, Peter; Rauchbach, Bernd. Luftwaffe Fighter-Bombers Over Britain. Stackpole, 2010.
Jackson, Robert. Hit & Run: Daring Air Attacks in World War II. Leo Cooper, 2015.
Kaplan, Philip, & Collier, Richard. The Few. Greenwich Editions, 1998.
Mason, F. K. Battle Over Britain. McWhirter Twins, 1969.
Newton, Denis. A Few of the Few. Australian War Memorial. 1990.
Vasco, John. Bombsights Over England: Erprobungsgruppe 210. JAC Publications, 1990.
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/177240
https://www.battleofbritain1940.net
https://keepituryens.wordpress.com/2016/08/15/
https://www.volksbund.de/
https://www.warstateandsociety.com (casualty figures).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kanalkampf
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